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1. Power Politics : The Cecils and Essex
In early September 1588, Leicester died of a fever at his country house at
Cornbury Park. He was travelling in the countryside to recuperate after the
rigours of the Armada campaign. Elizabeth was so upset by the news of her
favourite’s death that she locked herself away for several days, until Burghley
and other councilors ordered the doors broken open.1
After Leicester’s death, Lord Chancellor Hatton stood alone as the queen’s
senior favourite and Walsingham, a long-time ally of Leicester, became the lead-
ing advocate of the Protestant cause in English politics. As Secretary of State
since 1573, Walsingham had been burdened by illness and died in April 1590.
With Walsingham’s death, Burghley assumed the burden of Secretary of State in
addition to the treasureship. As the two senior members of the privy council,
Burghley and Hatton dominated a decisive role in advising the queen on major
policies. With a string of deaths of their colleagues in the council―Leicester in
1588, Mildmay in 1589, and Walsingham, Croft and Warwick in 1590―Burghley
and Hatton consciously sought to regulate the transfer of power to a new genera-
tion. The larger agenda behind their actions was to ensure stability when
Elizabeth herself finally died and the uncertain matter of the succession had to
be settled.
The younger generation they chose as the potential leaders at court were
Burghley’s younger son, Robert Cecil, and Leicester’s step-son, the earl of
Essex. During the 1580s, Essex became increasingly identified with his step fa-
ther, Leicester. After his return from the battle of Zutpen at the end of October
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1586, Essex made rapid progress towards obtaining the queen’s favour. With
Leicester’s strong support, Essex was promoted to Master of Horse, a post
Leicester had held since the first days of Elizabeth’s rein. This appointment
showed that Essex was allowed the privilege of regular attendance at court. The
queen bestowed upon Essex largesse which was being withheld from the major-
ity of her servants.
Walter Ralegh was another young favourite at court. Ralegh had initially
begun his career at court in the late 1570s as a follower of the earl of Oxford.
Like Oxford, Ralegh had mixed with a group of Cathlic courtiers who supported
Elizabeth’s marriage to the French duke of Anjou, in opposition to Leicester,
Walsingham and Sidney. When Oxford turned against the Catholic party and
denounced them as traitors, Ralegh followed suit and attached himself to
Leicester.2 This abrupt change of attitude secured him a military command in
Ireland. Ralegh’s service in Ireland was the springboard to reach the status of the
queen’s favourite.3 The growing importance of Ralegh in the West Country and
a series of lucrative grants in the mid1580s
4 depended entirely on Elizabeth’s
favour and generosity. These rewards aroused jealousies and created new ene-
mies at court. The worst enemy was Leicester. By 1585, Leicester was openly
hostile towards Ralegh and close followers of Leicester echoes their patron’s
views. Arrangement of a peace treaty with Spain, which Ralegh played a part in
negotiation at Elizabeth’s command, added another personal bitterness to court
politics in 1587 and provoked Leicester’s anger. Ralegh’s desire to maintain
royal favour made him stand against the Protestant cause advocated by the
Leicester group. Ralegh’s rivalry with Essex over the queen’s favour was inti-
mately connected with the larger question of English foreign policy.
The rivalry of Essex and Ralegh continued unabated during the late summer
and autumn of 1587. In mid-December 1587, Essex’s position at court received
a major boost when Leicester returned from the Netherlands campaign. Over
the winter of 158788, Essex acted in support of Leicester’s efforts to forestall
the formal opening of peace talks with Spain. In April 1588, at the age of twenty-
two, Essex was elected a knight of the garter with the votes of Leicester,
Howard, Burghley, Worcester and Huntingdon.5 By the time the Spanish fleet
sailed for England, Essex was an established figure at Elizabeth’s court. With
Leicester’s support, Essex had got the upper hand over Ralegh, obtaining sub-
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stantial material rewards from the queen. In October 1587, the queen granted
him parsonages and tilthes worth 300 pounds a year. By early 1588, Essex was
allowed use of York House. During Elizabeth’s reign, York House was normally
occupied by the lord chancellor or lord keeper,6 Hatton already had a grand town-
house, Ely Place at Holborn, when he was appointed lord chancellor in mid1587.
That’s why Essex was able to obtain a lease of York House. In June, Essex also
obtained a warrant for grant of lands from the attainted estate of Sir Francis
Englefied. By September 1588, this grant embraced most of the estate. After
Leicester’s death in early September 1588, Essex assumed his stepfather’s role
as the queen’s chief host to visiting foreign dignitaries. In January 1589,
Elizabeth granted Leicester’s farm of the customs on sweet wines for a term of
five years. Twice later renewed, this was to provide a vital support for Essex’s
finances throughout the next decade. Essex also obtained the parallel grant for-
merly held by Leicester for the port of Southampton. Leicester’s death also gave
Essex the large and diverse body of clients which Leicester had established over
several decades. As Essex had established himself securely as the queen’s prime
young favourite, a new court-based group of clients began to seek support from
Essex. They saw Essex’s rising fortunes as their ticket to crown appointments.
The co-ordination between Burghley and Hatton during 15901 in matters
of transference of power to a new generation centred on Essex and Cecil had not
always been well under way. The death of Walsingham in 1590 encouraged
Burghley to raise the issue of appointing a new secretary of state and Hatton put
forward Robert Cecil. However, Essex stood against this appointment by recom-
mending William Davison, ex-second secretary who had been disgraced by
Elizabeth for his part in the execution of Mary Queen of Scots. Essex’s support
for Davison was a token of his continuing personal commitment to Davison,7 Yet
Davison was clearly too inexperienced for so vital a post as the secretary of state,
especially when there were a number of alternative candidates superior to him.
Among them named as contenders for the post were Thomas Wilkes, Sir Edward
Stafford, Edward Dyer and Edward Wotton. As a consequence, Elizabeth refused
both Davison and Cecil to win the secretaryship in 1591. Despite his failure to
promote his younger son, Burghley’s entertainment of the queen at Theobalds
won Cecil a knighthood in May 1591.8 Moreover, Hatton’s direct lobbying as
Cecil’s chief supporter won Cecil a seat on the privy council.9 Although Essex
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stood against Cecil’s advancement, Burghley came out in support of Essex’s can-
didacy for the Rouen command. It was Essex’s first over-all command and was,
therefore, given strict instructions and a short commission. Elizabeth and
Burghley also surrounded the earl with a number of advisers : Sir Henry Unton,
who went as the queen’s ambassador, Sir Thomas Leighton, Henry Killigrew,
and Sir Thomas Sherley. Sherley was a treasurer for English forces in the Low
Countries and was also appointed treasurer for this expedition.10 As well as en-
suring a check upon excesses, these advisers offered a usuful hedge against the
French king who would use the English army for the benefit of his own purposes
as he had in 1589. Moreover, Essex and Unton were expected to send back full
reports on their actions at least once a week.11 Essex understood these limita-
tions and respected them in his actions, as he wrote to Burghley with gratitude
that he appreciated Burghley’s ‘wyse, favorable and fatherly instructions’ and
concluded thus : ‘I confesse myself bound infinitely for them [Burghley’s instruc-
tions] and I will with all duty and service desesrve your lordship’s precious
favour’.12 Nevertheless, Essex’s own ambitions in this venture were far greater.
He wanted to prove himself the epitome of martial virtue. The expedition to
Roen was for Essex the quest for honour.
Essex’s command in Normandy swelled his reputation on the international
scene. In France, in particular, his aristocratic bearing and martial zeal had a
powerful impact and firmly cemented his friendship with the French king, Henry
IV. Essex could lay claim to the role of Leicester as the leading advocate of the
overseas Protestant cause in English politics.
Despite these advances, Essex won no great victory in Normandy. Eliza-
beth had become thoroughly hostile to the Rouen expedition and to the respon-
sible commander himself. Essex’s hopes of glory and consequent political
influence came to nothing. When the chancellorship of Oxford again fell vacant
after Hatton’s death in late November, Elizabeth denied Essex the chancellorship
in order to punish him for his continuing unwillingness to give up his command
in France.
Hatton’s death in November 1591 radically changed the political balance at
the heart of the Elizabethan Court. The co-operation among men who had long
become accustomed to working together for the queen’s service was dead.
Burghley was the last fully active survivor of the old generation working with
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Hatton. With Hatton’s death, Burghley no longer had any equals in the council.
No lord steward was ever appointed to replace Leicester and no lord chancellor
was chosen to take the place of Hatton. So many deaths among the old council-
ors accelerated the transfer of political power to younger generation to sustain
the burden of work at court. Robert Cecil had been appointed to the council in
August 1590 and Walter Ralegh obtained an office at court, succeeding to the
post of captain of the guard.13 Essex’s promotion to the council became increas-
ingly inevitable. The council had declined precipitously both in numerical
strength and in the quality of its membership. The composition of the privy
council at the beginning of the 1590s was striking for the absence of the higher
nobility. There had been four earls on the council in 1588, but in 1591 there was
only the old earl of Derby, who was a regular absentee. In 1590, for example,
Derby only once signed a council letter.14 By 1592, When Burghley was branded
as a deliberate suppresser of the ancient nobility,15 impending noble appoint-
ments to the council became more urgent to restore the social standing the
membership of the council. Ironically, Burghley’s unprrecedented dominance in
the queen’s counsels opened up possibilities of promotion for Essex.
During February 1593, Burghley was ill, which meant that the privy council
was loosing the queen’s chief parliamentary manager and declining in the House
of Lords. Essex’s appointment would give the council a voice among the senior
nobility, and his supporters in the Commons would be made available to support
the council’s demand for a large, new subsidy. Essex began building an extensive
parliamentary patronage in 1593. In the parliament of 1593, thirteen member
owned their seats to Essex’s backing. Six sat for the Welsh boroughs where
Essex’s local influence was strong ; four for boroughs where Essex was high
steward. Of these two were adjacent to clusters of his estates, Tamworth and
Leominster ; and the other, Reading and Dunwich, were places where Essex
had newly acquired influence. In background and occupation, the members fall
into two main groups : veterans of the Low Countries and Rouen, and servants
of the earl such as his secretary, Thomas Smith, and family lawyer, Richard
Broughton.16
Essex also could offer valuable political resources for the council. His spon-
sorship of intelligence-gathering not only saved Elizabeth money but also helped
to increase her understanding of events overseas. The public and official sources
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of foreign intelligence that the English government possessed were in the Low
Countries and in France. In the Netherlands, Thomas Bodley was the offical
English agent. He sat on the Council of State and moved freely in Dutch circles.
Bodley and his assistant, George Bilpin, as well as the commanders of the
English Garrisons at Flushing, Brill, and Ostend, had many sources of informa-
tion both in the United Provinces and in the southern provinces. Essex opened
up a regular correspondence with these English officials as well as with the
English military commander in the Netherlands, Francis Vere. Essex also corre-
sponded with the English agents in France and maintained contact with the lead-
ing Huguenot lords, such as the Duke of Bouillon. Essex had established a direct
and personal link with the king of France himself since 1591. The network of
spies built up under the direction of Walsingham had been largely dissipated on
his death. Horatio Palavicino played a role of spymaster in the following years
after Walsingham’s death and supervised payments to various informers.17 Essex
exploited the existing intelligence network and also to build one of his own re-
porting directly to him.18 Once Essex set about building up a network of intelli-
gence outside the realm, the kings of France and Scotland, the Stadthelder of the
United Provinces, or the Grand Duke of Tuscany looked him as an influential in-
termediary with the English queen.
Essex’s vehement commitment to war also coincided with the needs of a re-
gime struggling to cope with a conflict in the continent. The council was criti-
cally short of men with military experience. Such a military leader as the late
Leicester had never been replaced and no new master of ordinance was ap-
pointed after Warwick’s death in 1590. Besides the lord admiral, the only genu-
ine soldier on the council was the lord chamberlain, Lord Hunsdon, who was old
and increasingly unable to undertake vigorous activities. The decline in martial
leadership at the highest level came at the time when the demands of war were
steadily expanding and the privy council was exerting an ever greater control
over all aspects of the war effort. These reasons were sufficient enough to per-
suade Elizabeth to allow Essex a place on the council board. In February 1593,
Essex at last became a privy councilor.
Essex’s enthusiasm for martial matters soon gave him unprecedented influ-
ence over war policy and military administration. By 1595, Essex was widely
recognised as playing a central role in military matters. At the same time, by
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1594, Essex had the greatest single intelligence apparatus in England. The earl
was able to receive news from an impressive range of contacts across Europe.
Essex’s involvement in the intelligence networking began in the early months of
1591, when he was approached by Thomas Phelippe and Francis Bacon about
employing an agent who could deal with English Catholic exiles in Flanders.
Phellipe and Bacon had been involved in intelligence matters with Walsingham
for a long time. Bacon had actged as an interrogator of suspects, and Phellipe
had been Walsingham’s chief decipherer and a controller for some of his key
agents.19 When Essex joined the Privy Council in 1593, Elizabeth gave special
encouragement to his work in the gathering of foreign intelligence. Offering in-
formation gathered by intelligence opened new political possibilities for Essex to
influence royal policies. The private audiences at which intelligence was im-
parted to the queen would give Essex the chance to emphasize special subjects
of his concern without interjection from other councilors. Intelligence, therefore,
became a central feature in Essex’s political endeavour. Essex invested a great
deal of time and money in pursuit of fresh information.
Yet, of course, Essex was not the only councillor who operated broad intel-
ligence networking. As secretary of state, Burghley gathered information by his
network of intelligence for the benefit of the queen. Under Walsingham, the
secretary’s post had been the focal point of intelligence-gathering. But
Burghley’s concern for finance had allowed Essex and other members of the
council to take up the slack by employing more agents themselves.20 Essex
seems to have used his intelligence activities to futher his ambition of succeed-
ing Burghley as Elizabeth’s chief adviser. Burghley and his younger son faced a
series of provocations from Essex in 1593. For example, Essex’s manoeuvering
over Anthony Sanden in June 1593 was an open affront to Bughley. Standen had
been an agent in Italy and Spain for Walsingham, and still remained active
through partnership with Anthony Rolston, who was based on the Franco-
Spanish border. In June 1593, Stande’s cover was blown and he returned to
England to find a cold reception from Burghley. Anthony Bacon, who had been
working as intelligent under Essex, was a close friend of Standen. Bacon pre-
vailed upon Essex to take Standen into his protection. In the event, Standen’s
career as a spy was finished but his long experience proved a useful resource for
the earl’s service.21 At another occasion, Essex took more subtle actions against
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Burghley. During 1593, Burghley was involved in co-ordinating secret overtures
to Rome over possible peace talks and he produced no concrete result.22 Cardinal
Allen received a report that the failure had been resulted form Burghley’s oppo-
sition to further dealings in the matter in spite of Essex’s urge for talks to con-
tinue.23 Whether or not this was true, blaming Burghley for the impasse and
portraying Essex as tolerant negotiator would reinforce hostility in Rome to-
wards Burghley. Moreover, such reports could further encourage English
Catholics to believe that their only hope for the future lay in support for Essex.
The tensions between Burghley and Essex in matters of intelligence per-
suaded Elizabeth to encourage specialisation in their intelligence. In effect, the
queen’s intervention not only reduced the potential for conflict over the next few
years but also enabled Essex and Burghley to pursue their own, different views
of foreign policy. Essex’s intelligence activities were primarily directed towards
Continent and the earl employed new agents in Italy, central Europe, and Spain.
Contacts in Scotland were also very important for Essex. In 1593, Essex estab-
lished contact with the Scottish king by Anthony Bacon through the intermedia-
tion of David Foulis. King James looked on Essex as his best supporter in
England. In his letter of 1594, James asked for continuance of the earl’s affection
and promised reward in proper time and place.24 By contrast, Ireland was vitally
important to Burghley, forming his intelligence triangle with Scotland and the
Low Countries.25 Outside these areas, Burghley had relatively few agents.26
Intelligence activities cost enormous and Burghley left Essex to pursue intelli-
gence in expensive locations such as Venice and Florence, while he concentrated
on Flanders, Scotland and Ireland. Despite their rivalry over policy-making,
there was occasionally active co-operation between Burghley and Essex in mat-
ters of intelligence. They shared information by the queen’s diplomats abroad.
As far as Burghley was concerned, it only became concerned if a diplomat
seemed to be becoming a partisan of Essex, a the expense of his own influence.
From Essex’s point of view, it enabled him to see much of the information which
Burghley was reporting to Elizabeth and the formulation of his policy advice.
Cultivating the queen’s ambassadors also enabled him to seek their support for
his operations abroad. Essex prevailed upon Thomas Edmondes, ambassador to
France in 15912, to provide the earl with copies of his dispatches. By 1595,
Edmondes was writing separate reports for Essex as well as sending copies of
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dispatches to Burghley. Essex had the same dealings with the queen’s represen-
tatives in the Low Countries. Essex began receiving reports from the English
agent there, Thomas Bodley, by May 1593, and later from his deputy, George
Gilpin. Essex’s preeminence among the queen’s suppliers of intelligence contin-
ued by the end of 1597, when Burghley’s younger son, Robert Cecil, at last ob-
tained the place of secretary of state.
As secretary of state, Cecil was now able to establish himself as the over-
seer of governmental intelligence gathering. Cecil also played a greater role in
co-ordinating intelligence gathered by other members of the council. In 1596,
the lord admiral recommended his agent Edmund Palmer to Cecil’s patronage.
Thereafter, they ran Palmer jointly. Lord Cobham, as Cecil’s father-in-law, had
always been an important source of information for Cecil and Burghley. This in-
telligence connection was reinforced by Cobham’s rivalry with Essex. Cecil’s
new competitiveness was also reflected in his extravagant expenditure on hiring
new agents of his own. Behind the rapid expansion of intelligence networking
was the threat of Spanish naval activities for the first time since 1588. Despite
the spectacular victory at Cadiz, England at the end of 1596 awaited Spanish in-
vasion fleet. While Essex involved himself in readying the defending armies,
Cecil launched a crash programme to hire spies. Cecil continued to expand his
intelligence apparatus, although the Spanish fleet was, in the end, destroyed by
a storm. By the end of 1597, Cecil was spending over 900 pounds a year on
wages for only ten of his more than twenty agents in Spain, Portugal, France,
Italy, Flanders, Sweden, Scotland and England.27 Anthony Bacon reported Essex
the low quality of Cecil’s new agents28 ; and yet Essex’s pre-eminence among the
queen’s suppliers of intelligence was over.
Throughout his career, Essex endeavoured to make himself the pre-
eminent patron of English soldiers. After February 1593, he was able to
capitalise on the privy council’s growing control over all aspects of the war effort
―appointment to military commands, pay, leave and contracts for supplies of
every kind.29 Leicester dominated military patronage in the Low Countries in the
mid1580s. No councillor was ever able to achieve such control again. Competi-
tion for commands and contracts for military supplies increased sharply in the
1590s. Almost every captaincy and contract involved struggles between rival
candidates supported by different members of the council. Essex had a decisive
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influence in these contests. He also had a powerful voice in the selection of of-
ficers for the army abroad. Essex was also able to exert himself in the dispensing
of military patronage through his friendship with the queen’s leading officers,
many of whom were his clients. These men came to depend upon Essex’s ability
to win additional supplies for their commands and leave for themselves. These
officers also cultivated links with other councillors, especially Burghley and
Cecil. Their power to appoint certain subordinate officers was most regularly
taken advantage of by Essex. For example, Essex won a promise from Robert
Sidney, Francis Vere, Lord Bugh, and Edward Norris.30 In Ireland, Essex sought
favour from WilliamRussell for his servants and followers there, promising his
support for Russell’s appointment as lord deputy.
Throughout his career, Essex endeavoured to make himself the pre-
eminent patron of English soldiers. A number of captains sought to associate
themselves with Essex. Many gentleman volunteers accompanied each of the ar-
mies which Essex formed. Lacking any formal appointment or pay, these men
served with Essex in the hope of winning some profit from the venture. Essex’s
ability to draw large numbers of volunteers to the queen’s standard increased the
efficacy of her forces without any extra burden to her exchequer. This drawing
power immensely strengthened Essex’s own personal status, both as the general
for a particular campaign and as Elizabeth’s conciliar expert on land warfare. Yet
Essex’s drawing power also saddled him with an enormous burden of expecta-
tion. Going on Campaign was an extremely expensive business and those who
followed Essex ultimately expected material benefit for the great risk and ex-
pense. In consequence, Essex always sought to ensure some reward for his fol-
lowers.
Essex’s reputation as the special patron of soldiers rode higher after every
expedition. Each success increased the numbers of hopeful soldiers who sought
to win reward and honour. Such expectations affected Essex’s stance on the
privy council While Elizabeth and Burghley became increasingly reluctant to
maintain English troops on the Continent, Essex insisted on staunch advocacy of
anti-Spanish campaign. Essex’s major concern was that Elizabeth might be with-
drawing England into an increasingly passive role in the war against Spain. The
growing insistence of Burghley that English resources must be transferred to
Ireland opened up the prospect that England’s war effort could be turned away
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from the Continent altogether. This could discourage professional soldiers who
expected material benefit from the war campaign.
Essex had received intelligence about Spanish activities from the news
about current events in Italy, the Ottoman Empire and southern Europe. Such
information enabled him to place Spanish actions in a larger context.31 For Essex,
Spain was such a giant enemy that England alone could not stand up to. So com-
mon cause had to be made with allies, and support had to be won from them.
Essex’s contact with France, Florence, and Venice, by exchanging intelligence
was one important means by which bonds of amity between states could be nour-
ished. Essex’s role as the purveyor of royal hospitality for important visitors to
England contributed to deepen the bond.
While Essex despaired about England’s growing estrangement from he
Protestant cause in the Continent, new political developments began to challenge
the realm of England. In 1595, Essex began to send agents to spy in Spain itself.
Before that time, the great bulk of Essex’s Spanish intelligence came from other
countries, especially from Antonio Perez in France. The first-hand Spanish intel-
ligence improved the quality of information; and consequently Essex became
alarmed by reports about the growth of the Spanish naval power threatening
England and Ireland.32 Essex insisted that England’s main effort should be di-
rected at Spain and its ports. Yet Burghley dismissed Thomas Wright’s early re-
port of a new Spanish Armada, by blaming that Essex was exaggerating the
Spanish threat. To convince Elizabeth of the Spanish invasion, Essex had to pro-
vide her with information that could prove the Spanish naval activities against
England. Essex’s establishing agents at port cities in Spain was intended to pro-
vide evidence to convince Elizabeth of the practicality of Essex’s Spanish argu-
ments.
In fact, Spanish naval preparations in 1595 were primarily defensive meas-
ure aimed against the long-delayed new expedition of Drake and Hawkins.33
Burghley and Cecil criticised that Essex played up the danger of a new Armada.
However, the pattern of ship movements and the strength of their flotillas sug-
gested that England faced genuine danger. Spain’s fleet had become stronger
since 1589, and in late4 July 1595, Spanish ships launched a small raid on
Cornwall, confirming the dangers of which Essex had warned. Spanish ships
again posed a direct threat to England. The growing revellion in Ireland also sug-
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gested a Spanish fleet night find a way to take advantage. Suddenly the danger
seemed very real and preparations began for a pre-emptive strike against Spain,
which grew into the Cadiz expedition. Essex prepared the Cadiz operation with
great care by collating intelligence about Spanish naval dispositions.34 The Cadiz
expeditions in 1596 and 1597 demonstrated Essex’s competence as a military
organiser.35
Essex’s success in winning command of the Cadiz and the subsequent Azore
ventures in 1596 and 1597 was the culmination of a long and consistent commit-
ment to his profession of arms. Essex spent time on campaign in every year be-
tween 1585 and 1597. The money Essex spent on war was also prodigious :
4,000 pounds in the Netherland, 3,500 pounds for the Armada emergency in
1588, 7,000 pounds in Portugal and 14,000 pounds for the Rouen expedition.36 A
total of 28,500 pounds expenditures came out of Essex’s own pocket. Essex was
never ignorant of the precariousness of his financial position. Yet he continued
to spend heavily on matters relating to war. Essex staked his credit on the suc-
cess of the venture.
Although eager to dominate military patronage, Essex was at the centre of
efforts to reform and modernize England’s war effort. For the Cadiz expedition,
Essex abandoned the traditional practice of ‘dead pays’.37 In Star Chamber, Essex
“inveighed with great force”38 against abuses in the levy system, and urged the
death penalty for malefactors. Essex argued that specific military abuses should
be treated as folonies and even draw up a draft in parliament bill.39 Elizabeth rec-
ognized Essex’s zeal for reform and, in March 1597, the queen appointed him
master of the4 ordinance with specific directions to control this notoriously cor-
rupt military administration. In a tribute to his efficiency and probity, the term
of his appointment was for life.40
As a military commander, Essex was a strict disciplinarian. In contrast to
the prevailing opinion that soldiers were the scum of society,41 Essex claimed
that a camp should be “the best schoole to make religion truely felt, and piety
and honestie to be duly practised”.42 Essex’s insistence that civilians must be
treated with respect also won him great plaudits.43 During his military appren-
ticeship in the Netherlands, under the influence of Sidney and Leicester, Essex
made plain his commitment to fighting for the Protestant cause. Essex learned
that the Protestant communities of northern Europe, and the religious truth
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which they represented, must be defended from the forces of the Counter-
Reformation. From the start of his military career, Essex’s view of war were
dominated by a crusader’s religious zeal. The whole notion of the Protestant
cause gave him a sense of mission on an international scale.
Therefore, the financial inquisition into the Cadiz expedition by the council
proved deeply wounding to Essex’s martial and aristocratic pride. Elizabeth ex-
pected great riches from the victory at Cadiz and thus got furious when so little
money reached her coffers and so much went to her soldiers. Burghley and Cecil
placed the chief blame for the poor return on Essex rather than the lord admiral.
The Cecils explicitly blamed Essex in the presence of the queen for the low
quantity of prize goods recovered from the fleet after its return, even though this
task had been deputed to various friends and associates of the Cecils.43 Burghley
and Cecil attacked Essex over the booty obtained by Essex’s soldiers and the po-
tential profits lost to the queen by failing to capture either of the Spanish treas-
ure fleets. The attack on Essex’s probity produced bitterness among his
followers, who feared the political consequences of this criticism. For many
Essexians, it seemed that Elizabeth was being led to disregard to victory at Cadiz
and to impugn the whole field of martial honour.
The criticism of Essex threatened to expose fundamentally divergent views
about war and honour between Essex and Burghley. Contrasts were drawn be-
tween the bold spirit of men who ventured their lives in the service of their
country and those who only accounted for financial success of the expedition.
The financial inquisition into the Cadiz expedition moved men of virtue in an
open campaign against the corruption which they believed was imperiling Eng-
land’s ability to wage war. Burghley’s long stewardship of the royal finances was
characterized by a profound conservatism, which inhibited the efficient use of
drown resources, exacerbated the steady decline in the rate of tax collection and
allowed internecine warfare among officials in the exchequer.44 Essex and his fol-
lowers clearly recognized the need for financial reform.
After Cecil’s appointment as secretary of state, the growing rivalry between
Essex and the Cecils had a disturbing impact upon national politics. The nation’s
political elite became divided by this rivalry, and the divisions between the two
sides grew bitter. In pushing forward the Cadiz expedition, Essex and the Cecils
were co-operated for the sake of military necessity. However, the expedition re-
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sulted in the collapse of Essex’s relationship with the Cecils. During 1596 and
1597, the Elizabethan court saw the outbreak of factionalism.
2. Honour Culture and Essex’s Myth
After his return from Irish expedition in 1599, Essex provoked Elizabeth’s
anger and lost her favour, which resulted in the earl’s expulsion from the English
court. In an attempt to gain access to the queen again and to defeat those who
were hostile to him, Essex and his followers endeavoured to seize the court by
forcible occupation of Whitehall. Essex’s scheme involved the Scottish king. In
his uprising, Essex also asserted that his ’enemies’ were taking advantage of the
uncertainties of the succession to the ruin of the realm and were pressing the
cause of the Spanish infanta in an attempt to seek peace with Spain and to con-
sort with papists for the benefits of themselves. Essex attempted to lead James
to the front line and urged the king to declare his right to the English crown. In
his letter to James sent before the uprising, Essex wrote who stood against
James’s right for the English throne: Raleigh in the West Country, Cobham in
Kent, the second Lord Burghley as lord president of the North, Carew in Ireland,
all of whom were closely tied to Robert Cecil. The rivalry with the Cecils forced
Essex to take the plunge of abetting the coup.
Essex’s desperate uprising failed. His revolt was not only a material failure
but also a moral one in terms of the honour-culture with which Essex had always
been identified. After the failure in London uprising and the retreat to Essex
House, the decision left for Essex to take was how he was to die. Even before
the surrender, Essex seemed determined on his own death. In the course of the
surrender negotiations, he told Robert Sidney that “For as to my life . . . I hate
it . . . Death will end all, and death will be welcome to me.”45 At the trial, one of
Essex’s closest associates gave evidence against him; then the others followed
suit. When confronted by confessions already made by his closest associates, re-
vealing all the details of the plans to seize the court, and to take the Tower,
Essex conceived himself betrayed by them. At first, at his trial, Essex defended
himself in terms of the honour-culture. However, his resentment against his as-
sociates incited him to undergo a violent revulsion, and to repudiate almost all
the positions he had taken up at his trial. Essex’s aristocratic lineage, his mili-
tary career, and the tradition he inherited all had created the earl the paradigm
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of honour. Essex attracted to himself a following whose influence extended to
over a dozen counties, which included representatives of leading gentry families
and a number of peers. Yet the behaviour of his associates and Essex himself at
the trial revealed that the moral front of the honour revolt had been crumbled.
After his condemnation and return to his cell in the Tower, Essex deter-
mined to take the whole responsibility for the revolt upon himself, requesting the
lord admiral “to desire Her Majesty to inflict all the torments upon him that
could be invented, for the punishment of the rest to be diminished.”46 Essex in-
sisted that his plot to seize the court had intended as a means of access to the
queen and his entry into the City had been merely to defend himself against his
enemies. Therefore, at the trial, Essex was willing to be accounted “law’s trai-
tor, and would die for it.”47 Essex saw himself as a man of arms, ruled by the
sanctions of the military culture and its code of honour. In his eyes the law rep-
resented pedantry, which was alien to heroic greatness. Thus after his condem-
nation for treason, he could insist that he was nevertheless “the low’s traitor”
and the victim of the “rigour and quirks” of the lawyers.48 In terms of honour-
culture, the condemnation had no validity. At his trial, Essex asserted : “I have
done nothing but that which by the law of nature and the necessity of my case I
was enforced into.”49 The law of nature formed the basis of the various continen-
tal codes of hounour,, but not to the common law.50
Essex saw himself as chosen, both by lineage, and by his tenure of the office
of earl marshal, to be the natural leader of a community of honour. Essex inher-
ited pride of ancestry from his father ; and he was told at the beginning of his ca-
reer by his father’s secretary, Edward Waterhouse, that the aristocratic qualities
of fortitude, temperance, courtesy, affability, and constancy were innate in his
blood.51 The consciousness of distinguished ancestry remained with Essex
throughout his career. The sense of ancestry struck a self-confidently arrogant
note and enhanced a sense of being trodden underfoot by “base upstarts.” At the
surrender of Essex House Essex told Robert Sidney that “whether it can be brief
to a man descended as I am, to be trodden underfoot by such bases upstarts.”52
Essex’s followers had similarly experienced the competitive pressure and had
seen their long-established place in their county hierarchies challenged by the
rise of new families enriched most commonly by lawyer or courtier fortunes.53
The sense of political frustration, of being unjustly slighted and so their honour
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defaced, was an experience shared by many of the Essex’s followers.
The Essex circle was also bound together by a web of blood relationship.
The ties of mutual loyalty and support were based on kinship and affinity. The
earl of Southhampton asserted at his trial, “the first occasion that made me ad-
vance into these causes was the affinity between my lor od Essex and me, I being
of his blood, so that for his sake I would have hazarded my life.”54 The earl of
Rutland, whose wife was Essex’s niece, “resolved to live and die with him.”55 Sir
Edward Lyttleton of Pillaton, Staffordshire, had been brought into the Essex cir-
cle by his Devereux alliance.56 The Essexians regarded the Cecilians as tied to-
gether by their natural greed characteristic of the low-born : the Cecilians
exploited their corrupt monopoly of the Queen’s favour to bar the natural elite,
the nobility, from access to her person.57
In the beginning of his trial, Essex intended to underwrite the traditional
dissidence of honour which bound men of lineage and lordship to each other in
the obligation to confront unworty ministers. It was from this standpoint that the
earl was able to reassure Archibishop Whitgift soon after his arrest. Essex told
him that “the sincerity of my conscience, and the goodness of my cause, both
comfort me.”58 Essex believed that his status ‘earl marshal’ gave him warrant to
reform the state and to judge his enemies by using the summary jurisdiction of
a court of chivalry.,59 Essex placed great emphasis of his own role on his office
of earl marshal, which made him believe his role as the guardian and overseer of
honour.60
Yet within twenty-four hours of his condemnation, Essex abandoned the
canons of honour and presented himself as an abject penitent. He drew up a self-
inculpatory confession, revealing details of the proposed Whitehall coup d’etat,
admitting responsibility for the action. Essex’s confession went further to de-
nounce the close associates who had been involved in planning the revolt, nam-
ing Southhamton, Danvers, Lyttleton, Davies, and Blount whose guilt had
already been established by their own confessions.61 Essex also inculpated others
previously thought to have been only marginally involved, such as Henry Duffe,
Penerope Rich, Henry Neville, Mountjoy and Sandys. What motivated this ex-
traordinary change of attitude was the disintegration of the honour community of
which Essex had been the centre. The persisting tension within the group be-
tween the claims made on honour by loyalty both to the queen and their leader
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had surfaced to the earl’s disadvantage. While the bonds of friendship and the
union of minds and hearts had bound them in honour to Essex ; and yet honour
also had raised the issue of faithfulness to the queen. As the leaders of the court
faction, Southhampton, Blount, Mountjoy, and Essex himself were all inseparable
from the court-based honour structure. Their resources, their mode of wielding
political power, their capacity to translate aspiration into the pattern of a career,
even their inherited status, were all unthinkable apart from the organs of the
monarchical state. For such political elites, the source of honour could no longer
be conceived as inherent in locally orientated communities of honour centering
on the lord, after the older medieval pattern. They had derived their status and
fortune from the rewards of service to the monarchical state. The queen had
been the source of honour system. Their coup d’etat had revealed the self-image
of the group as dissident and conformist, which honour could not resolve.
After all, the honour community of which Essex had been the centre had al-
ready, by the end of his trial, disintegrated under the stresses of failure and the
fear of death. Essex conceived himself betrayed by those whom he had thought
“are engaged with me, and whose hearts are purely affected. . . ”,62 for whom he
had prepared himself to die. He saw himself forced into a hopeless insurrection
and then abandoned by those who had been most vehement in its instigation.
“A man’s friends will fail him; all popularity and trust in men is vain, as I have
had experience”63 ―Essex’s despair and denunciation of his friends proved his
own unfaithfulness in the end. The Essexian claim to reform the commonwealth,
based on lineage, faithfulness, arms, the appeal to heroic and aristocratic cha-
risma, and to popularity, had achieved nothing beyond a political and moral col-
lapse, which compelled Essex himself into a total self-repudiation. Essex’s image
as the paradigm of honour, the chivalric and Protestant hero, was defaced.
＊＊＊＊＊
Writings about ‘honour’ circulated in England and Scotland at the turn of the
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. They shared the common view that blood and
lineage predisposed to honourable behaviour. The Book of the Ordre of Chyvalry,
translated by William Caxton sometime between 1483 and 1485 from a French
version of Ramon Lulla “Le libre del orde de cauayleria,” referred to lineage as
of the essence of knighthood.64 The Boke of Saint Albans, reprinted again and
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again between 1486 and 1610, followed the tradition which divided mankind into
the descendants of Japheth, who was ennobled by the paternal blessing conferred
on their ancestor Noah, and the descendants of Ham, who was rendered ignoble
by Noah’s curse.65
On the other hand, the Bartolan view, which was circulated particularly
among the meritocratic nobilities of Western Europe, emphasized the nature
of honour as the reward of virtue.66 For both Lulla and St Albans author, the
nobility’s lineage needed to be supplemented by virtue. The Boke of Saint Albans
listed the virtues which should cultivate: fortitude, prudence, wisdom, hope, and
steadfastness, all of which related to conduct in war and battle. The Book of the
Ordre of Chyvalry regarded virtue as essentially prowess and the nobility of his
courage by which the knight proved his noble origin.67 A martial and warlike em-
phasis was significant and there was no reference in these early expositions of
honour to learning as a qualification for nobility. Alexander Barclay, for example,
differentiated the man of honour from the man of the robe or the ecclesiastic by
insisting that the former was the man of deeds, not of the book. Barclay wrote
in The Mirour of Good Maners (1570) thus : “A straw for thy study, thy reason
is but blind, / To waste time in words, and on no deed to muse, / . . . / Therefore
reader refuse / Superfluous study and care superfluous, /And turne thy chief
study to deeds virtuous.”68 Gerard Legth in his The Accedens of Armony in 1562
defined the ’virtue’ which conferred honour as a “glory not by courage of manh
ood,” “martial prowess” as “the chief advancer of gentry.”69 The martial refer-
ence, with its framework of heroic values and chivalry, thus imparted a hint of
violence to the deeds which honour was earned. Yet the man of honour did not
need to be a soldier, nor did honour necessarily require a setting of battle. In
peace time, honour could become self-assertiveness, the capture of the attention
of public esteem.
Aggressiveness was always latent in the relationship of men of honour, al-
though subject to the restraints imposed by the solidarities of honour, namely, by
lordship, kinship, and friendship. In an honour society, violence, or the ever-
present possibility of violence, was a way of life. The competitiveness was veiled
by the routines of good manners and courtesy, which helped to contain the latent
violence within acceptable limits. But violence was always liable to escalate from
its latent to an actual state, when its expression was the armed conflict of the
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duel. This became extremely popular from the mid-sixteenth century by the in-
troduction of the new art of fence after the Italianate style, using the rapier.70
Consistency in standing by a position once taken up was basic to the honour
code. This took the form of promise and oath, the giving of one’s word, the word
of honour. Once this had been done, the man of honour could withdraw only at
the expense of the diminishment involved in dishonour.71
The political culture of the world of honour was essentially pluralist.
Honour societies revered kingship, but there implied the possibility of changing
one’s master, if he could no longer be freely and honourably served.72 Kingship
constituted one authority among a number. What such authorities had in com-
mon was the institution of lordship, and the king was the greatest of lords. The
king’s court was the largest, richest and most brilliant of all honour communities.
It was during the Tudor period that the realm and the community of honour came
to be identical, presided over by a crown whose sovereign authority constituted
the only kind of lordship. During the reign of Henry VIII, the kingship took a
powerful initiative to establish itself as “the found of honour,” the source not
only of “dignity” and office within the crown’s gift, but also of gentility itself.
Lordship emphasized the hierarchical character of honour. For the man of
honour ‘lorship’ implied a relationship of faithfulness to his master, which was
owing as long as the latter showed himself a good lord, who was just, rewarded,
and took counsel. Lordship deployed itself in the household of a landed magnate
or of the king with its inner circle of officers and servants, and its outer circle of
client gentry of the affinity, who called themselves ‘followers’ or ‘friends’. The
code of honour required faithfulness to friends as well as to one’s lord. The no-
tion of friendship commonly indicated a relationship between equals, and often
arouse out of “chamber companionship― the sharing of lodgings by young men
serving at court or in great household. A lord’s friendship showed itself in the
special trust, good will and ‘favour’ extended to dependent, requiring a response
of fidelity and gratitude from him. Friendship, trust, and fidelity were closely
linked. Where a dependant’s faithfulness could never be called in question, the
natural response of the lord was ‘friendship.’ The most obvious expression of
this would be the grant of office and favours. Honour implied a pressure towards
the consistency of public attitude which faithfulness to lords and friends involved.
Therefore, when lords confronted unworthy or tyrannical rulers, the political
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conflict most likely resulted in war and battle to remove them. The War of the
Roses was among such movements.73
By the end of sixteenth century, there were the social changes which had
dissolved the kind of society in which the traditional politics of violence could be
practiced. The expansion of the gentry class and changes in its structure had un-
dermined the relationship of dependence upon and affinity with the nobility. The
rise of the grammar school with its humanist and religious emphasis, caused to
end the aristocratic household and its honour culture as the typical educational
environment for lay members of the ruling class.
It was the Erasmians and humanists who gave priority to virtue over lineage
and learning over arms. A prime influence at work was that of the Florentine
neo-Platonists, reaching England by way of Erasmus, Thomas More, Thomas
Starkey and Thomas Elyot, then through such handbooks of morals and honour
as those of Castiglione and Romei.74 Plato saw wisdom as the supreme virtue,
placing it above the drive of the will and urge to glory appropriate to fighters.
The Platonic stress on wisdom emerged from a culture of Florentine humanism.
Thomas More had deployed the concept in his Utopia, where the rule of wisdom
shone the more brightly against the ‘ignorance’ of the nobility and the ‘idleness’
of the traditional communities of honour.
But it was Thomas Elyot who successfully steered the course from the older
primacy of ’prowess’ in the culture of honour to a style of chivalry which also im-
plied learning. In The Boke named the Governour Elyot outlined the formation of
a learned knighthood. Sidney’s Arcadia, written for those ruled, intended to
show that the magnanimity of the Aristotelian hero was ineffectual to set “a stay
upon the exorbitant smilings of chance,”75 unless transcended by wisdom and re-
ligion. Arcadia defined the background for the new-style honour community : one
which was romantic and positive, but also humanist and protestant. In Arcadia,
Honour required the Protestant knight to extend himself “out of the limits of a
man’s own little world, to the government of families and maintaining of public
societies.” he made “his chief ends . . . above all things the honour of his Maker,
and the service of his Prince, or coutrey.”76 Arcadia remodelled chivalry found its
appropriate symbol in the Elizabethan Accession Day Tilts, in which Philip
Sidney and his circle played a prominent role. Through the courtly jousts, the
ancient allegiances of chivalry were drawn close to the queen and there occurred
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an imaginative re-feudalization of society. The Queen’s Accession Day itself was
built up as a great national festival, a day on which her subjects were reminded
of the Protestant triumph over the papal. The festivities on the Day were both
courtly and popular. At court there was a ceremonial tournament in which
Elizabeth received the homage of her lords and gentlemen, who came to the tilt
in disguise, often riding upon pageant cars attended by allegorical personages
who in prose, verse, and song paid the queen tribute. All over England, Eliza-
beth’s subjects expressed their joy in her government by prayers and sermons,
bell-ringing, bonfires and feasting.
The courtly chivalry of the jousts, the Accession Day Tilts, were begun by
Henry Lee at the beginning of Elizabeth’s reign. In 1571, the first year recorded
in the tiltyard, Lee was appointed Lieutenant of the Royal Manor of Woodstock.
In 1574, he was appointed Master of the Leash. Thenceforward, Lee appeared in
all court fetes until 1580 when he was made Master of the Armoury. Lee’s per-
sonal appearance at, and supervision of, the Queen’s Day shows continued until
his retirement in 1590.77
Appearance at the tilts cost much ; yet the occasion was politically effective
to gain the queen’s favour. After Lee’s official resignation in 1590, Essex domi-
nated the tilts. The eight tournaments during the first seven years of Elizabet
h’s reign appear to have served primarily as an opportunity for some of her aspir-
ing courtiers to vie for her favour by impressing her with feats of arms and lavish
display. Particularly prominent were the two Dudley brothers : Ambrose, the
earl of Warwick, and Robert, soon to be the earl of Leicester. At the beginning
of Elizabeth’s reign, the Dudley family was in a precarious position. After their
treasonous involvement in the Lady Jane Grey conspiracy, it had only been be-
cause of their conspicuous military service at the siege of St. Quentin that in
1557 Queen Mary lifted from them the act of attainder that had marred the for-
tunes of the entire family. Both Ambrose and Robert had been friendly with
Elizabeth in earlier days, and her accession to the throne enabled their political
fortunes to flourish. For the Dudley brothers, the tiltyard offered opportunities
for public displays of loyalty and martial talent. Such motives were to set a pat-
tern for future young hopefuls at Elizabeth’s court. In the 1570s and early 1580s,
the most memorable was Philip Sidney, who was Leicester’s nephew; and in the
1580s and 1590s, the earl of Essex, Leicester’s stepson.
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Young aspirants such Sidney and Essex were attracted by the chivalric ide-
als so colourfully passed on to them in the literature of the romances. Sidney’s
first appearance at an English tournament was in the Whitehall tiltyard on
Accession Day in 1577. he was twenty-three years of age, and had already a cer-
tain amount of experience following his recent service with his father in Ireland
and on an important European mission for Elizabeth. Sidney appeared in the
shape of shepherd, attended by a group of ploughmen.78 When he arrived in front
of the gallery, one of the ploughmen recited the poem ‘Philisides, the Shepherd
good and true.’ It tells how Philisides called upon Menalcha, the husbandman, to
persuade him to set aside his plough in order to celebrate the forthcoming
Accession Day. The ploughman’s recital was followed by a song in praise of
Elizabeth. Sidney’s entry into the tiltyard provided him with the perfect stage to
dramatize his ideals of romantic chivalry. Sidney saw himself as the self-
appointed saviour knight of Protestantism. The image of Protestant knight, cul-
tivated by his successive appearances in the tiltyard, was strengthened by his
daring opposition to Elizabeth’s possible marriage to a Catholic prince, and ulti-
mately mythtified by his death in Zutphen expedition in the service of the
Protestant cause in the Continent.
Essex first made his appearance at an English tournament in November
1586, just after he had returned from Zutphen in the black-draped ship bearing
Sidney’s body. Thereafter, when not serving overseas and when not in disgrace
at court, Essex appeared at virtually every English tournament until his uprising
and the subsequent execution in 1601. By the time Essex first began tilting be-
fore a public audience in 1586, the political value of creating a strong impression
in the tilt-yard had long been recognised.79 Essex was a particularly energetic
and accomplished jouster. At the Accession Day tilts of 1588, 1590, 1594 and
1596, Essex acted as a principal challenger, showing himself to the world as a
dashing young knight and the queen’s particular favourite. All the magnificence
of his appearance, and the elaborate praise of the speeches which accompanied
it, were ostensibly in Elizabeth’s honour. Essex exploited these occasions to en-
hance his public reputation. He constantly sought to stand out from other com-
petitors as a way of emphasising his pre-eminance in martial affairs. Essex also
mounted increasingly elaborate entertainments to accompany his appearances in
the tilt-yard. The importance which Essex attached to his public displays in the
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tilt-yard can be seen in the time and money which he invested in them. Essex
spent heavily to display himself appropriately on these occasions. He primarily
sought to impress observers with the size and magnificence of his display, the
traditional symbols of a great nobleman. Clearly, he viewed these occasions as
essential investments for advancing and sustaining his reputation as Elizabeth’s
great chivalric favourite. By indulging in martial display, Essex also encouraged
popular support for the war and for his own pre-eminent role in it. Above all,
such open display of martial virtue was part of Essex’s dedication to the cult of
honour. At the heart of this code was the idea that noble virtue should be both
displayed and recognized publicly. In cultivating his public image, Essex was
therefore constantly proclaiming his conformity to this code.
In the manner of Sidney, Essex modeled his behaviour on the ideals of chi-
valric romance. His enthusiasm for self-dramatization was demonstrated in many
events of his career. On the English expedition to Portugal in 1589 in 1589,
Essex displayed his knightly valour by being the first Englishman to wade
ashore ; at Lisbon he offered to fight all-comers in honour of the queen ; and at
the siege of Rouen in 1591 he challenged the enemy commander to single com-
bat. During the campaign in the Low Countries Essex became the closest friend
of Philip Sidney, who bequeathed his best sword to Essex as he lay dying in the
battle of Zutphen, pleading with Essex to marry his pregnant wife, Frances
Walsingham, and to protect his young daughter. Thereafter, Essex assumed the
role of Sidney as self-proclaimed Protestant activist hero, the knightly champion
of English Church and state against the threat of Rome and Spain. The political
stance with which Sidney enthusiastically identified himself was that of the
Leicester-Walsingham policy of Protestant activism, which was also inherited by
the earl of Essex.
The Elizabethan vogue for tilts and tournaments was the outcome of con-
flicting interests of the crown and her aristocratic courtiers as well as a mediation
of factional and personal conflicts among the courtly ranks.80 Through its conven-
tions of feudal loyalty and romantic devotion, Elizabethan chivalry confirmed
Tudor sovereignty. Tournaments provided the queen with a means of consolidat-
ing and maintaining domestic unity and regal authority at home. Queen’s
warriors’s prowess in feats of arms was duly reported by foreign visitors in their
dispatchers to other European courts. Tournaments thus played important func-
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tion in building Elizabeth’s reputation abroad. But they also gave vent to aristo-
cratic aggression and competition for the courtly honour and reward. Essex
stood and died for the martial and aristocratic values that had been essential to
chivalric romance.
For the contemporaries, Essex emerged as the new Sidney. George Peele,
for instance, linked the two military heroes when he wrote An Eclogue
Gratulatorie to welcome Essex home from the Portugal expedition in 1589. The
tributes to Essex during the years from 1587 to 1590 when he was emerging as
a major public figure all paid homage to Essex in the same way as Peele’s. Essex
was praised for his love of chivalry, his zeal for the Gospel, his boldness in the
cause of his faith and the queen.81 The 1590 Faerie Queene, the epic poem which
Edmund Spenser published but never finished, reintroduced into Elizabethan
courtliness the radical Protestant doctrine which had been promoted by the
Leicester-Walsingham faction. Spenser’s association of courtiership with activity
flattered the expansionist impulses of courtiers such as Walter Ralegh and the
earl of Essex. From the beginning of his epic, the poems to the individual books
had traced different and more personal search for masculine self-affirmation from
that of the courtier. In his narrative e emphasis upon the male courtier, the
Faerie Queene could exercise her power only through a masculine intermediacy.
The poem’s title showed that Elizabeth in her persona of the Faerie Queene was
both the poem’s chief protagonist and its principal theme; and, as Spenser’s
statement later in his letter addressed to Walter Ralegh implied, the mythtic
English hero, Arthur, was introduced as the prototype of Spenser’s perfected
noble person.
In The Faerie Queene, Arthur contained within himself the twelve
Aristotelian moral virtues which were to be the themes of his epic twelve books.
Each of these virtues was to be explored in turn, through the quests of a series
of knights. Both Arthur and these knights linked the dimension of chronological
time with an eternal other world, that is, the golden-walled city of Cleopolis at
the centre of faerieland where Queen Gloriana resides. Gloriana is the ‘true glo-
rious type’ of all of these various virtues. Yet it is Arthur and the other questing
knigthts who are Gloriana’s earthly imitators and applying her individual and
composite qualities. The quests of the knights parallels the Neo-Platonic concept
of soul’s progressive separation from deity, taking them away from the Queen
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and the heart of fairy. In contrast, Arthur’s quest progressed in the movement
of return to spiritual source, leading him toward the Faerie Queene. On the level
of political allegory, the possible meeting and marriage between Arthur and
Gloriana would seemingly have represented Arthur’s initiation into kingship as
ruler of the immortal body politic of England signified by Gloriana. This restora-
tion of a masculine political authority by marriage to the powerful female mon-
arch was foreshadowed in the epic by the story of Britomart and Artegall. The
story implied a serious criticism of the Elizabethan cult by the portraiture of
Elizabeth’s gender as political authority seriously restricting the potential of her
male courtiers for action.
The scholars, writers, and dramatists who had attached themselves to the
Essex’s circle, presented the image of honour in a sophisticated and glamourized
way. Henry Cuff, ex-Oxford professor and one of the Essex’s secretaries, aimed
at a revival of honour through its alliance with letters, in the sense of Tacitean
and humanistic scholarship, with a view to a martial society in which “learning
and valour would have the pre-eminence.”83
George Chapman was among the Essexian dramatists who aimed at a re-
vival of honour and heroic virtue. Chapman dedicated his translation of Iliad in
1598 to the earl of Essex, describing him as “most true Achilles, whom by sacred
prophecy Homer did but prefigure.”84 Samuel Daniel saw Essex as destined to
lead the chivalry of Europe in a renewed crusade against the infidel.85 A historical
work, The First Part of the Life and Reign of King Henry IV by John Hayward, was
also an outstanding instance of the Tacitean school of historiography, which
flourished in the Essexian circle. Essex himself was acquainted with Tacitus, and
occasionally quoted him in his correspondence. A cultivation of Tacitean styles
and attitudes was a characteristic of the Essex circle.86 Hayward was a Cam-
bridge civil lawyer who was not a member of the circle, but who aspired to join
it, and hoped that The First Part would attract Essex’s patronage. It was pub-
lished in 1599, just before Essex’s departure for Ireland. The real theme of
The First Part was the fall of Richard II, and the role of Henry of Lancaster in
bringing it about. Essex had a great interest in the history of Richard II. The
earl had patronized and applauded a play of Richard II, whether Shakespeare’s or
another.87
At the beginning of his work, Hayward presented honour as the motive
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force of history.88 In his narratives, history was written to eternalize honour.89
Then, why in the reign of Richard did the polity become unnaturally distorted,
and the king a tyrant? It was because, in Hayward’s analysis, the natural political
class, conceived as those qualified by lineage and inherited honourable status to
rule, were excluded from the king’s confidence. Thus Henry of Lancaster in
Hayward’s history said : “The king regarded not the noble Princes of his blood
and Peeres of the Realm . . . instead of these he was wholly governed by certaine
new-found . . . favourites, vulgar in birth, and corrupt in qualities, having no
sufficencie eyther of councell in pece, or of courage war.”90
How, then, was this state of affairs to be remedied? It was by the common
action of the nobility under their natural leader, Henry Lancaster. What united
them in resistance to Richard’s corrupt regime was, of course, the bond of
honour. The political leader must always be ready for the bold, heroic initiative ;
and willing to stake all in the gamble with Fortune. Richard, seeking safety in
surrender to his enemies instead of ending his life with glory in battle against
them, failed in heroic initiative and had to endure the shame of his fall and sub-
sequent abject fate.91 Hayward’s analysis of the fall of Richard II shaed the view
with which Essex and his friends saw their relationship to the Cecilian regime,
and the continued disfavour with which they were regarded by Elizabeth.
The writers and intellectuals who had attached themselves to the Essex cir-
cle were building up Essex into the image of the charismatic hero, heightening
the hopes and expectations which centred on him. Essex was the pre-eminently
successful courtier who could always seize Fortune’s forelock and turn failure
into success up until his desperate Irish campaign in 1599.
＊＊＊＊＊
Within a few weeks of Essex’s execution, William Barlow publicized in
Paul’s Cross sermon the details of Essex’s confession at his trial.92 Barlow in-
tended to complete the earl’s disrepute by this, which, however, was “very offen-
sively taken of the common sort.”93 Essex’s supporters disseminated the view
that the earl’s confession at his trial “concerned only great repentance for the
sins of his youth.”94 From the political point of view, the Essexians began to re-
construct their political base to exercise power in the new reign. Soon after
Elizabeth’s death and the enthronement of the new king, the image of Essex as
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the chivalric Protestant hero was restored. Poets, dramatists, and ballad-writers
who rallied around such survivors of the Essex faction as Southhampton and
Mountjoy, glorified Essex and presented him once more as the victim of the
law’s pedantry and of the envy of his base-born enemies. Robert Prickett’s long
elegiac poem, “Honour’s Fame in Triumph Riding, or the Life and Death of the
Late Honourable Earl of Essex” written in 1604 was dedicated to Southhampton
and Mountjoy. Samuel Daniel’s play Philotas in 1605 depicted its hero as an ex-
ample of injured innocence. University and Inns of Court students also wrote
poems related to the fall of the earl of Essex.95 They portrayed Essex as a patri-
otic supporter of the queen, a military hero, and a popular leader disgraced by his
political enemies such as Robert Cecil, who urged that Essex be sent on the dis-
astrous Irish expedition. Many of Essex’s partisans were4 in the Inns of Court
and they shared his ambition and his frustration. The pro-Essex literature em-
phasized the saintliness of the earl’s death and the errors which had led him into
treason to the provocations of his opponents. Even Essex’s enemies were com-
pelled to accept his rehabilitation. Both Cecil and Nottingham admitted that
Essex had died like a Christian.
The rehabilitation of Essex’s honour and the consequent revival of his popu-
larity at the advent of James’s reign demonstrated the change in the political
climate. James not only forgave the partisans of Essex but showered honours
upon them. Even before reaching London, James had signed a warrant for
Southhampton’s release from the Tower. Southhampton immediately sped north
and joined the court at Huntingdon where he was given the office of carrying the
ceremonial sword of state.96 Francis Bacon, Fulke Greville, Henry Savile, and
Henry Wotton, all of whm Essex had patronized, were knighted. Robert Sidney
became a baron,and Mountjoy, who was Essex’s lieutenant and successor in
Ireland, became the earl of Devonshire. Essex’s young son was proclaimed by
James to be the eternal companion of his eldest son the Prince of Wales.
King James’s general lionization of Essex’s family and followers influenced
the composition of the queen’s court. James had issued a proclamation that Lady
Rich’s precedence would be that of the oldest earls of Essex, that is, over all
daughters of all earls except those of the earls of Arundel, Northumberland,
Shrewsbury, and Oxford.97 The ladies in the queen’s household were drawn from
women related to members of the Privy Council and gentlemen of the king’s and
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prince’s households ; and inevitably the queen’s household was dominated by for-
mer followers of the earl of Essex.
In May 1603, James issued an order which showed respect to the English
ancient nobility. James noted that the “ancient nobility whose birth and merit
makes them more capable than others.”98 Through the secret correspondence
with the earl of Northumberland while in Scotland, James had been informed of
Elizabeth’s unjust evaluation of the ancient nobility and the consequent discon-
tentment among them. Such nobilities as the Essexians had strong conscious-
ness of distinguished ancestry. The sense of ancestry, in their context, was
marked by a nostalgia for past glories, and a sense of being under siege. They
felt, as Essex had complained, that the base upstarts had trod them underfoot.
Under the reign of Elizabeth, they had seen their long-established place in their
county hierarchies challenged by the rise of new families. The sense of political
frustration, of being unjustly slighted and so their honour defaced, was an expe-
rience shared with such peers as the Essexians. The king’s order in 1603 thus
presented his political answer for competing demands of the English nobility.
The rehabilitation of the Essexians, who had risen against Elizabeth for the great
cause to save their honour, was James’s political maneuvers to satisfy the discon-
tented English nobilities and to balance the political power between the ancient
nobility and the upstarts such as the Cecilians. The revival of Essex myth and
the restoration of the honour culture was a repercussion of the late Elizabethan
political defeat of the Essexians.
To Cecil, the revival of the Essex interest could pose a significant long-term
threat. The revival of the Bedchamber in the court of James as a focus of influ-
ence and patronage undercut Cecil’s previous near-monopoly of influence. Under
Elizabeth, power had been concentrated in the hands of the Privy Council.
Elizabeth’s ladies of the Bedchamber rarely meddled in politics, though occasion-
ally they attempted to advance the careers of relatives and friends. King James,,
on the other hand, was surrounded by the gentlemen of his Bedchamber, all of
whom had followed the king from Edinburgh. Cecil had survived the immediate
transition into the new reign ; and yet he could not rely on the automatic continu-
ance of his position. Cecil would have to prove his worth afresh, adapting to
James’s wishes if he was to remain in power. After the death of Essex, there had
been no voice in the council nor at court that could speak with the authority of
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the secretary of state. All the public business at court had been in Cecil’s hands.
James had been fully aware of Cecil’s power at court as he described Cecil as
‘king there in effect’ when corresponding with Cecil while in Scotland. Yet James
had strong opinions of his own and a very high estimate of his kingly abilities. On
learning of Elizabeth’s death, James at once sent Cecil from Edinburgh an infor-
mal interim ratificaiton of the position of all Elizabeth’s council.100 James set Cecil
against those of preeminent nobility of rank and blood such as the old Essexians
in order to keep them under control. Elizabeth had handled the faction leaders
by competing them for her favour. James used the same tactics to maneuver the
power struggle between Cecil and the other leading peers of ancient birth. The
rehabilitation of the Essexians at James’s court was one of the faction-maneuver
strategies of the new king.
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